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The classical view of currency crises is that they arise because govern-
ments print money to ﬁnance ongoing or prospective deﬁcits. This view,
embedded in so-called ﬁrst-generation models and their modern variants,
is especially appealing for explaining twin banking-currency crises (see,
e.g., Krugman 1979; Flood and Garber 1984; Obstfeld 1986; Calvo 1987;
Drazen and Helpman 1987; Wijnbergen 1991; Corsetti, Pesenti, and
Roubini 1999; Dooley 2000; Lahiri and Végh 2000; and Burnside, Eichen-
baum, and Rebelo 2001). These crises entail large ﬁscal costs, associated
with restructuring and recapitalizing failing banking systems, that are not
typically ﬁnanced by large explicit ﬁscal reforms. Despite the appeal of
these models, they suﬀer from an important empirical shortcoming: they
generally predict that inﬂation rates should be high after a currency crisis.
In reality, many large devaluations are followed by moderate rates of money
growth and inﬂation. This raises three questions. First, how do govern-
ments actually pay for the ﬁscal costs of twin banking-currency crises? Sec-
ond, what are the implications of diﬀerent ﬁnancing methods for postcrisis
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models be reconciled with the data?
To pay for the ﬁscal costs of twin crises, a government must use a combi-
nation of the following strategies: (a) implementing an explicit ﬁscal reform
by raising taxes or reducing spending; (b) explicitly defaulting on out-
standing debt; (c) printing money to generate seigniorage revenues; (d) de-
ﬂating the real value of outstanding nonindexed nominal debt; or (e) en-
gaging in an implicit ﬁscal reform by deﬂating the real value of government
outlays that are ﬁxed, at least temporarily, in nominal terms (e.g., civil ser-
vant wages or social security payments).1 In a world of forward-looking
economic agents, diﬀerent mixes of these strategies have diﬀerent implica-
tions both for the severity of a currency crisis and for postcrisis inﬂation
rates.
We analyze these implications using a version of the model in Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001) in which a currency crisis is triggered by
prospective government deﬁcits. To simplify our exposition we reduce the
model to its essential elements: a money demand speciﬁcation, a govern-
ment budget constraint, a rule for exiting the ﬁxed exchange rate regime,
and an assumption about the nature of monetary policy after the devalua-
tion. We show that a government that pursues strategies (c)–(e) can pay for
large ﬁscal costs associated with large devaluations while generating very
moderate degrees of postcrisis inﬂation. Thus, models in which prospective
deﬁcits are the root cause of large currency crises can be reconciled with ob-
served post–currency crisis inﬂation rates.
We begin our theoretical analysis with a version of the model in which
purchasing power parity (PPP) holds and all government liabilities are per-
fectly indexed to inﬂation. This model predicts much lower devaluation
rates and much higher inﬂation rates than those observed during currency
crisis episodes.
We then consider two extensions to the basic model. First, we introduce
two types of nonindexed government liabilities: domestic bonds issued be-
fore agents learned about prospective deﬁcits, and public spending whose
value is preset in units of domestic currency. With these elements, the model
can generate more plausible implications for the behavior of inﬂation but
can only produce moderate rates of devaluation.
Second, we eliminate the assumption of PPP. This breaks the link be-
tween domestic inﬂation and exchange rate depreciation. We introduce
three departures from PPP: (a) nontradable goods (e.g., housing, educa-
tion, and health); (b) costs associated with distributing tradable goods (e.g.,
transportation, wholesaling, and retailing); and (c) nominal rigidities in the
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1. The ﬁscal costs could also be paid for with international aid, namely through subsidized
loans granted by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Jeanne and
Zettelmeyer (2001) argue that the subsidy element of IMF lending is small. For Korea and
Mexico they estimate that this subsidy amounted to less than 1 percent of GDP.prices of nontradable goods.These elements allow the model to account
more closely for the high rates of devaluation and low rates of inﬂation that
are often observed in the wake of currency crisis episodes.
We use our model to interpret two recent currency crises: Mexico in 1994
and Korea in 1997. Our analysis suggests that the Mexican government will
likely pay for most of the ﬁscal cost of its crisis by printing money. In con-
trast, the Korean government is likely to do so via a mixture of future im-
plicit and explicit ﬁscal reforms.
Estimates of the cost of the Mexican crisis vary widely, but, as a bench-
mark, we put it at roughly 15 percent of Mexico’s 1994 gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP). We estimate that the government has so far paid for about 30
percent of the ﬁscal cost of the crisis via a mix of debt deﬂation, ﬁscal re-
forms, and seigniorage. We show that the rest of the ﬁscal cost can be paid
for by seigniorage revenues if the government prints money at historically
typical rates. Consistent with what our model predicts for a crisis ﬁnanced
primarily by printing money, Mexico’s twin crisis was associated with a rel-
atively large rise in the rate of inﬂation.
The ﬁscal cost of the Korean crisis is thought to be roughly 24 percent of
1997 GDP.2 Our calculations indicate that the government has so far paid
for roughly 25 percent of this cost via a mix of debt deﬂation, ﬁscal reforms,
and seigniorage revenue. Consistent with this estimate, the Korean govern-
ment has accumulated a great deal of new debt—17.3 percent of GDP—to
ﬁnance its crisis in the short run. Our model can account for the large de-
valuation and modest postcrisis inﬂation rates in Korea under the assump-
tion that much of the remaining ﬁscal cost of the crisis will be ﬁnanced
through future explicit and implicit ﬁscal reforms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 7.2 uses the
government’s intertemporal budget constraint to discuss the diﬀerent ﬁ-
nancing strategies available to the government. Section 7.3 presents our ba-
sic model. Section 7.4 discusses two extensions: incorporating nonindexed
government liabilities and eliminating the PPP assumption. Section 7.5
contains our discussion of the Mexico 1994 and Korea 1997 crises. Section
7.6 contains concluding remarks.
7.2 The Government Budget Constraint
Explicit default aside, a government must satisfy its intertemporal bud-
get constraint. In this section we display a version of this constraint that is
useful for discussing the diﬀerent strategies that a government can use to
pay for the ﬁscal costs of a twin crisis. Later we adopt a particular model of
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2. This estimate is from Standard and Poor’s sovereign ratings services. See Goldstein (1998)
for a discussion of various estimates of nonperforming bank loans that underlie the banking
crisis in Korea.speculative attacks to study how these strategies aﬀect the severity of a cur-
rency crisis and postcrisis inﬂation rates.
We consider a continuous-time, perfect-foresight economy populated by
an inﬁnitely lived representative agent and a government. All agents, in-
cluding the government, can borrow and lend in international capital mar-
kets at a constant real interest rate r.
For now we assume that there is a single consumption good in the econ-
omy and no barriers to trade, so that PPP holds:
(1) P t   StPt ∗.
Here P t and Pt ∗ denote the domestic and foreign price level respectively,
while St denotes the exchange rate (deﬁned as units of domestic currency
per unit of foreign currency). For convenience, we assume that Pt ∗   1.
In each period the government purchases goods, levies lump sum taxes,
and makes transfers to the representative agent. In addition, the govern-
ment can print money and issue debt. Government spending, taxes, and
transfers have an indexed component, with real values gt,  t, and vt, respec-
tively. These variables also have nonindexed components with nominal val-
ues Gt, T t, and V t, respectively. It is convenient to deﬁne the variable Xtthus:
Xt   Tt   Gt   V t
The government issues two types of debt. The ﬁrst type is dollar denom-
inated so that its real value is invariant to the domestic rate of inﬂation. We
denote the dollar debt at the beginning of time t by bt. The second type of
debt is denominated in local currency and is not indexed to the domestic
rate of inﬂation. To simplify matters, we assume that this debt takes the
form of consols, issued before time zero. Each consol has a constant coupon
denominated in local currency. Because expected inﬂation was zero when
the bonds were issued, we assume, to simplify, that the coupon rate on the
bonds is equal to the real interest rate, r. We denote the nominal value of the
consols by B. To simplify notation, we assume that the stock of nominal
debt remains constant and all new debt is dollar denominated.
We consider an economy that is initially operating under a ﬁxed exchange
rate so that St   S. At time zero, news arrives that the government’s future
liabilities will be higher than previously anticipated. We interpret the rise in
liabilities as reﬂecting transfer payments associated with bank bailouts or
with other ﬁscal liabilities of the government.
To be concrete, before time zero, private agents assumed that vt   v for 
all t. At time zero they learn that transfers will increase permanently after 
date T :
 
vt   v for 0   t   T ,
vt   v for t   T ,
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sults. We use   to denote the present value of the increase in transfers:
(2)    
 
T 
e rt(vt   v)dt
The government’s ﬂow budget constraint is
(3)  bt      mt if t   I,
b ˙





     t   gt   vt    
X
St
t     m ˙ t    tmt if t   I.
Throughout the paper, x ˙t denotes dx/dt. Here  t is the inﬂation rate, P ˙
t/P t.
The variable mtrepresents the dollar value of money balances, deﬁned as mt
  Mt/St, where Mt denotes nominal money holdings. Note that m ˙ t   tmt is
equal to the dollar value of seigniorage, M ˙
t/St. As in Drazen and Helpman
(1987), equation (3) takes into account the possibility of discrete changes in
mtand btat a ﬁnite set of points in time, I. We will discuss the points at which
these discrete changes occur.
According to equation (3), the change in btis equal to the primary deﬁcit,
gt   vt –  t – Xt/St, plus the interest cost of servicing the indexed government
debt (rbt) plus the real cost of paying interest on the nonindexed consols,
rB/St, minus seigniorage revenue, m ˙ t    tmt.
The ﬂow budget constraint, together with the condition lim
t→  e–rtbt   0,
implies the intertemporal budget constraint
(4) b0   
 
0






















According to equation (4), the initial stock of real indexed government debt
is equal to the real present value of current and future surpluses and
seigniorage revenue minus the real present value of the consol payments.
It is useful to derive the conditions under which a ﬁxed exchange rate is
sustainable, so that St   S for all t. For now we assume that there is no out-
put growth and foreign inﬂation is zero (we relax these assumptions in sec-
tion 7.5). Consequently, the government does not collect seigniorage under
a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, and its intertemporal budget constraint is
given by
(5) b0   
 
0














We assume that this sustainability condition holds before agents receive in-
formation at t   0 about the new, higher, level of future deﬁcits.
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assumption that at t   0 private agents learn that the present value of the
deﬁcit has increased by  . Also suppose that private agents correctly believe
that the government will not undertake an explicit ﬁscal reform that fully
pays for  . To simplify, suppose that  
0
 ( t – gt – v)e–rtdt remains constant.3
Then we can use equations (2) and (5) to rewrite equation (4) as
(6)    
 
0
(m ˙ t    tmt)e rtdt  ∑
i I
e ri mi
   
B
S








 e rtdt     
 
0   
X
S
t      
X
St
t   e rtdt .
According to equation (6), the present value of the prospective deﬁcits,  ,
must be ﬁnanced by a combination of (a) seigniorage revenues [ 
0
 (m ˙ t  
 tmt)e–rtdt   ∑i Ie–ri mi]; (b) a reduction in the real value of nonindexed
debt [B/S –  
0
 (rB/St)e–rtdt]; and (c) an implicit ﬁscal reform that increases
the real value of the nonindexed component of the ﬁscal surplus [ 
0
 (Xt/S –
Xt/St)e–rtdt]. It follows that the only way that the government can satisfy its
intertemporal budget constraint is to use monetary policy to generate a
present value of seigniorage revenues and implicit ﬁscal reform equal to  .
To see this, suppose for a moment that the ﬁxed exchange rate could be
sustained after new information about higher deﬁcits arrived. Then the
money supply would never change and the government could not collect
any seigniorage revenues. This, in conjunction with the fact that the price
level would be ﬁxed, implies that all of the terms on the right-hand side of
equation (6) would equal zero. Then, however, the government’s budget
constraint would not hold. This would contradict the assumption that the
ﬁxed exchange rate regime was sustainable. We conclude that the govern-
ment must at some point move to a ﬂoating exchange rate system.
The particular characteristics of a crisis depend on the ﬁnancing mix cho-
sen by the government. For example, the government could pay for most of
the bank bailout by reducing the real value of outstanding nominal debt
with a devaluation at time zero. Under these circumstances, the currency
crisis would be associated with little future money growth or inﬂation. This
scenario is closely related to the work of Cochrane (2001), Sims (1994), and
Woodford (1995) on the ﬁscal theory of the price level.4 In contrast, if the
government does not have any nonindexed liabilities, then the bank bailout
would have to be ﬁnanced entirely via seigniorage revenues. This would
have potentially very diﬀerent implications for money growth and inﬂation.
To analyze the implications of diﬀerent ﬁnancing strategies we must make
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3. Our basic result would not be aﬀected by a ﬁscal reform as long as the present value of the
change in the primary surplus induced by the reform was less than  .
4. See Corsetti and Mackowiak (1999), Daniel (2001), and Dupor (2000) for applications of
the ﬁscal theory to open economies.additional assumptions about government policy and the behavior of
private agents. We discuss these assumptions in the following section.
7.3 The Basic Model
In this section we analyze a simple benchmark model in which PPP holds
and the government does not have any nonindexed liabilities.
In addition to borrowing and lending in international capital markets,
private agents can also borrow and lend domestic currency at the nominal
interest rate, Rt. Under perfect foresight
(7) Rt   r    t,
where r and   denote the real rate of interest and inﬂation.
The demand for domestic money has the form suggested by Cagan (1956):
(8) ln  
M
P t
t      ln( )   ln(Y)    Rt
Here Mt denotes the beginning of period t domestic money supply, and   is
a positive constant. The parameter  represents the semielasticity of money
demand with respect to the interest rate. To simplify, we assume that do-
mestic agents’ per period real income, Y, is constant over time.5
7.3.1 The Fixed Exchange Rate Regime
Suppose that the home country is initially in a ﬁxed exchange rate regime
so that St   S. Equation (1) implies that the domestic rate of inﬂation  t is
equal to the foreign rate of inﬂation, which we assumed to be zero. It follows
from equation (7) that the nominal rate of interest is equal to the constant
real interest rate: Rt rfor all t 0. Under a ﬁxed exchange rate, the money
supply must equal money demand:
(9) M   S Yexp(  r).
Because the money supply is constant, the government cannot generate
seigniorage revenues. Of course, if there were growth in either the foreign
price level or domestic real income, the government would collect some
seigniorage revenue in a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. This possibility does
not aﬀect our basic argument. The present value of such seigniorage rev-
enues would have already been incorporated into the government’s precri-
sis intertemporal budget constraint.
7.3.2 A Currency Crisis
In the presence of prospective deﬁcits, the government must at some
point move to a ﬂoating exchange rate system. The precise time at which
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5. See Lahiri and Végh (2000) for a discussion of the output eﬀects of currency crises.this occurs depends on (a) the government’s rule for abandoning ﬁxed ex-
change rates and (b) the government’s new monetary policy.
With respect to (a) we follow a standard assumption in the literature that
the government abandons the ﬁxed exchange rate regime according to a
threshold rule on government debt (see, e.g., Krugman 1979; Flood and
Garber 1984). Speciﬁcally, we assume that the government ﬂoats the cur-
rency at the ﬁrst point of time, t∗, when its net debt hits some ﬁnite upper
bound. This is equivalent to abandoning the ﬁxed exchange rate when the
amount of domestic money sold by private agents in exchange for foreign
reserves exceeds   percent of the initial money supply. In addition to being
a good description of what happens in actual crises, the threshold rule can
be interpreted as a short-run borrowing constraint on the government: it
limits how many reserves the government can borrow to defend the ﬁxed ex-
change rate.6 Rebelo and Végh (2001) discuss the circumstances in which it
is optimal for a social planner to follow a threshold rule.7Although they use
a general equilibrium model, their framework is similar in spirit to the
model used here.
With respect to postcrisis monetary policy, we assume that at some point
in the future (t   T) the government will engineer a discrete increase in the
money supply equal to   percent of M, deﬁned in equation (9). Thereafter,
the money supply will grow at rate  . These assumptions imply that the
money supply evolves according to8
(10) Mt   
e  M,f o r t∗   t   T
Mt   e   (t T)M,f o r t   T.
This speciﬁcation decouples the endogenous timing of the speculative at-
tack from the time at which the government undertakes its new monetary
policy. In equilibrium the parameters   and   must be such that the gov-
ernment’s intertemporal budget constraint, equation (6), holds.
Note that the rate of inﬂation, the money supply, and the level of govern-
ment debt can be discontinuous. However, the exchange rate path must be
continuous. To see why, suppose to the contrary that there was a discontin-
uous increase in the exchange rate at time t∗. Because PPP implies that P t  
St, inﬂation would be inﬁnity at t∗. This would imply that the nominal in-
terest rate would also be inﬁnity at t∗ and that money demand would fall to
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6. Drazen and Helpman (1987), as well as others, have proposed a diﬀerent rule for the gov-
ernment’s behavior: ﬁx future monetary policy and allow the central bank to borrow as much
as possible, provided the present value budget constraint of the government is not violated.
This rule ends up being equivalent to a threshold rule. See Wijnbergen (1991) and Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001) for a discussion.
7. This result emerges when there are signiﬁcant real costs associated with a devaluation,
such as loss of output.
8. Implicit in this description is the assumption that a solution for t∗ such that t∗   T exists.
We will see that this assumption holds in our analysis.zero. Because the government is only willing to buy   percent of the money
supply, this cannot be an equilibrium. We utilize the continuity of St exten-
sively in the derivations below.
7.3.3 Solving for the Time of the Speculative Attack (t∗)
The key equation in determining the time of the speculative attack is the
money demand function in equation (8) which implies9






e (s t)/ ln(Ms)ds.
Because the exchange rate must be a continuous function of time, PPP im-
plies that the price level too must be continuous. We now exploit this conti-
nuity requirement to solve for t∗.
By deﬁnition, the ﬁxed exchange rate regime ends at time t∗. The price
level an instant after t∗ is given by





t∗ln(Ms)e (s t∗)/ ds.
An instant before the devaluation money demand implies that
(13) ln M   ln P   ln( Y)    r.
Continuity of the price level at t∗ requires that ln P t∗   ln P. Using equa-
tions (12) and (13), we obtain





t∗ln(Ms)e (s t∗)/ ds.
Using equation (10) and the fact that the currency is devalued when the






t∗ln Mse (s t∗)/ ds 
  ln M   [1   e (T t∗)/ ]   (      )e (T t∗)/ .
Substituting equation (15) into equation (14), we can solve for the time of
the speculative attack:10
(16) t∗   T   ln  
   
 
    
   .
This formula implies that the speculative attack occurs before any money is
printed: t∗   T.
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9. See Sargent and Wallace (1973) for a derivation.
10. It can be shown that if the value of t∗ implied by equation (16) is less than zero, the at-
tack happens immediately; that is, t∗ 0. In this case the exchange rate is discontinuous at time
zero.Thus, other things equal, t∗is larger the longer the government delays im-
plementing its new monetary policy (the larger is T) and the more willing
the government is to accumulate debt (the higher is  ). In addition, the
higher the interest rate elasticity of money demand (the larger is  ) and the
more money the government prints in the future (the higher are   and  ),
the smaller is t∗.11 The intuition underlying these results is as follows. Once
the ﬁxed exchange rate regime is abandoned, inﬂation rises in anticipation
of the increase in the money supply that occurs from time T on. A higher
elasticity of money demand ( ) makes it easier for the money supply to fall
by  percent. This means that the threshold rule is activated sooner, thus re-
ducing the value of t∗. Higher values of  and  also reduce t∗because they
lead to higher rates of inﬂation, making it possible for a drop of   percent
in the money supply to happen sooner.
7.3.4 Solving for the Equilibrium
Given ﬁxed values for T and  , the value of   must be such that the gov-
ernment’s intertemporal resource constraint, equation (6), holds. Since we
initially abstract from nonindexed government liabilities (B   0, Xt   0),
this constraint simpliﬁes to
(17)    
 
T
(m ˙ t    tmt)e rtdt   e rt∗ mt∗   e rT mT.
Here we have used the fact that no seigniorage is collected between t∗ and
T because the money supply is constant during this time interval. We also
used the fact that there are two jumps in real balances, the ﬁrst at t∗, which
triggers the devaluation, and the second at time T, when the government en-
gineers a discrete jump in the money supply.
After time T the rate of inﬂation is constant and equal to the money
growth rate,  . This in turn implies that real balances are also constant and
equal to  Yexp[– (r    )]. Using this result, we can rewrite the constraint
in equation (17) as
(18)   e rT  
 
r
  Yexp[  (r    )]   e rt∗ mt∗   e rT mT.
Solving for the equilibrium of the model amounts to solving equations (16)
and (18) for the two unknowns (t∗,  ).
7.3.5 A Numerical Example
To discuss the properties of the model it is useful to present a numerical
example. The parameter values that we use, summarized in table 7.1, are
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11. Some caution is required in interpreting these results because we are not free to vary the
parameters on the right-hand side of equation (16) independently of each other. When one pa-
rameter is varied,   or   must be adjusted to ensure that the government resource constraint
is satisﬁed.loosely based on Korean data. We normalized real income, Y, and the ini-
tial exchange rate, S, to 1. We set the semielasticity of money demand with
respect to the interest rate,  , equal to 0.5. This is consistent with the range
of estimates of money demand elasticities in developing countries provided
by Easterly, Mauro, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1995). We set the constant   
0.06 so that the model is consistent with the ratio of the monetary base to
GDP in Korea before the crisis (6 percent). We set the real interest rate, r,
to 4 percent.
Next we discuss the initial value of the debt, the ﬁscal cost of the currency
crisis, and threshold rule parameters b0,  , and  . Consistent with the as-
sumptions of the basic model, we abstract, for now, from nonindexed debt
and focus on the real consolidated foreign debt of the Korean government
and the central bank. The Korea Institute for International Economic Pol-
icy estimated that the foreign debt of the public sector in June 1997 was
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Table 7.1 Parameters for the Numerical Examples
Parameter Description
A. Benchmark Case
  = 0.5 interest elasticity of money demand
  = 0.12 threshold rule parameter
S = 1 initial exchange rate
  = 0.06 constant in the money demand function
r = 0.04 real interest rate
Y = 1 constant level of output
  = 0.24 present value of new transfers
b0 = –0.067 initial debt level
T = 1 time of switch to new monetary policy
  = 0.12 % increase in M at T relative to t = 0
  = 0 distribution cost of tradables
  = 1 share of tradables in CPI
Z = 0 nominal transfers
B = 0 nominal debt
B. Nominal Debt
Same as A except
B = 0.05 nominal debt
C. Implicit Fiscal Reform
Same as B except
Z = 0.022 nominal transfers
T2= T + 2 date until which transfers stay constant
D. Sticky Nontradables Prices
Same as C except
  = 0.5 share of tradables in CPI
T1 = T date until which nontradables prices are sticky
E. Distribution Costs for Tradables
Same as D except
  = 1 distribution cost of tradablesequal to 2.0 trillion won.12According to the International Monetary Fund’s
International Financial Statistics, the value of the central bank’s net foreign
assets was approximately 28.0 trillion won. This suggests that the net for-
eign assets of the consolidated public sector were equal to roughly 26.0 tril-
lion won or 6.7 percent of 1996 GDP. For now, we ignore the government’s
domestic debt and set b0 to –0.067 (we incorporate domestic debt into the
analysis in section 7.5). The parameter   was set to 0.24, which is, in our
view, a conservative estimate of the ﬁscal cost of Korea’s banking crisis rel-
ative to its GDP.13The value of  was set to 0.12 to match the fall in the mon-
etary base between December 1996 and December 1997. We also set the
value of   to 0.12 to match the ratio of the average value of the monetary
base in the second half of 1999 versus the ﬁrst half of 1997. We set T   1.
Finally, we solved for the value of   that satisﬁes the government’s inter-
temporal budget constraint, which is   0.18. We emphasize that there is
considerable uncertainty about the true values of all the aforementioned
parameters. However, in practice we found that the qualitative characteris-
tics of the results that we stress are robust to reasonable perturbations of the
benchmark parameterization.
The ﬁrst row of table 7.2 summarizes the implications of the benchmark
model for inﬂation and the rate of devaluation. Figure 7.1 depicts the paths
for the exchange rate, the price level, and the money supply in the bench-
mark model. Several features are worth noting. First, the attack happens af-
ter agents learn about prospective deﬁcits (at t   0) but before new mone-
tary policy is implemented (at T   1). As in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo (2001), the model is consistent with the currency crisis not being
predictable on the basis of classical fundamentals such as past inﬂation,
deﬁcits, and money growth. An observer of this economy might be tempted
to attribute the crisis to self-fulﬁlling expectations. In fact, the collapse was
caused by fundamentals—the need to ﬁnance prospective deﬁcits with
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12. The data are published on the web at [http://kipe.go.kr].
13. See Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2000) for a discussion.
Table 7.2 Results for Numerical Examples, No Explicit Fiscal Reform




Yr 1 Yr 2 Run Yr 1 Yr 2 t* Seigniorage Deﬂation Reform
A. Benchmark 34.9 20.0 20.0 34.9 20.0 0.49 100.0 0.0 0.0
B. Nominal debt 30.9 16.1 16.1 30.9 16.1 0.52 83.4 16.6 0.0
C. Implicit ﬁscal 
reform 20.2 6.1 6.1 20.2 6.1 0.60 35.9 13.1 51.0
D. PNT sticky 17.7 4.0 4.0 35.4 4.0 0.61 21.4 12.4 66.2
E. Distribution 14.0 1.0 1.0 57.8 1.0 0.64 7.2 9.8 83.0seigniorage revenues. Second, as in all ﬁrst-generation models, there is a dis-
crete drop in net foreign assets at the time of the attack. Third, the model re-
produces the fact that inﬂation initially surges in the wake of the exchange
rate collapse and then stabilizes at a lower level.
We conclude this section by discussing some obvious shortcomings of the
model. First, the timing of the devaluation is deterministic: everybody
knows the precise time at which the ﬁxed exchange rate regime will collapse.
This shortcoming can be remedied by introducing some element of uncer-
tainty into the model, such as money demand shocks.14 Second, the model
predicts counterfactually large rates of inﬂation after a crisis. In our example
inﬂation is 35 percent in the year of the crisis and 20 percent in steady state.
This is inconsistent with the postcrisis inﬂation experience of countries like
Mexico and Korea (see section 7.5). Finally, the model implies that the rate
of inﬂation coincides with the rate of exchange rate depreciation. This, too,
is inconsistent with the evidence. After a speculative attack, rates of devalu-
ation are typically much larger than the corresponding rates of inﬂation.
7.4 Model Extensions
This section incorporates two extensions of our framework designed to
address the second and third shortcomings of the benchmark model. First,
we introduce nonindexed government liabilities. Second, we eliminate the
assumption of PPP. With these modiﬁcations the model can account for
two key features of the data: (a) the rate of devaluation in a currency crisis
is typically much larger than CPI inﬂation, and (b) the rate of inﬂation can
be quite moderate in the wake of a currency crisis.
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Fig. 7.1 Solutions from the benchmark model: A, CPI and exchange rate; 
B, money balances
Notes: Time measured in years. Initial money balances are normalized to equal 1.
14. See Flood and Garber (1984) and Drazen and Helpman (1988) for a discussion of spec-
ulative attack models with uncertainty.
AB7.4.1 Nonindexed Government Liabilities
We consider two types of nonindexed government liabilities: (a) domes-
tic bonds (B) issued before agents learned about prospective deﬁcits, and (b)
public spending whose value is preset in units of domestic currency (Xt). In
the presence of these liabilities the government budget constraint, equation
(18), is replaced by
(19)   e rT 
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Recall that the term B/S –  
0
 (rB/St)e–rtdt is the revenue obtained from de-
ﬂating nonindexed debt. The term  
0
 (Xt/S – Xt/St)e–rtdt is the value of the
implicit ﬁscal reform accomplished by deﬂating the nonindexed compo-
nents of the ﬁscal surplus.
As in the basic model, t∗is given by equation (16), so the equilibrium val-
ues of t∗ and   can be computed using equations (16) and (19). Finally,
equation (11) allows us to compute the equilibrium path for the price level
and the exchange rate.
Nonindexed Debt
To see the impact of nonindexed debt on the model’s implications for in-
ﬂation and devaluation rates we now turn to a numerical example. We as-
sume that nonindexed debt is equal to 5 percent of GDP (B 0.05). As with
our other parameter values, this number is loosely motivated by the Korean
experience. Recall that nominal debt in the model is a perpetuity, so its du-
ration is diﬀerent from that of Korea’s debt. For this reason it is not appro-
priate to use the measured stock of nonindexed debt on the eve of the crisis
to calibrate B. We chose B so that the amount of revenue from debt deﬂa-
tion is roughly consistent with the evidence from Korea presented in section
7.5.
Table 7.2 shows that introducing nonindexed debt lowers the growth rate
of money   that is necessary to pay for  . As a result, steady-state inﬂation
declines from 20.0 percent in the base model to 16.1 percent. Obviously,
with more initial nonindexed debt, the crisis could be ﬁnanced with less re-
course to inﬂation. For example, if Bequaled 0.5, the rate of inﬂation would
be 15.5 percent in the ﬁrst year after the currency crisis and 2.1 percent
thereafter. The government would only raise 14.6 percent of the ﬁscal cost
of the crisis from seigniorage revenues. The balance would come from debt
deﬂation. Thus, in principle, allowing for nonindexed debt can reconcile
our basic model with the observation that inﬂation is often quite moderate
after a currency crisis. However, for Mexico and the countries involved in
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be a complete resolution of the problem.
Implicit Fiscal Reform
We now allow for an implicit ﬁscal reform as a source of revenue for the
government. Speciﬁcally, we assume that G 0.02; that is, nonindexed gov-
ernment spending is about 2 percent of GDP. In addition, we assume that
G is ﬁxed in nominal terms for roughly 2.5 years after the crisis and then
starts growing at the rate of inﬂation. Thus, in this example the implicit ﬁs-
cal reform amounts to a permanent reduction in the real value of govern-
ment spending relative to GDP. In our case study of Korea we examine the
sensitivity of our results to alternative mixes of implicit and explicit ﬁscal
reforms.
Table 7.2 makes clear that allowing for an implicit ﬁscal reform has a sig-
niﬁcant impact on the model’s predictions. Relative to the scenario in which
the only nonindexed liability is nominal debt, year 1 inﬂation falls from 30.9
percent to 20.2 percent. Long-run inﬂation falls from 16.1 percent to 6.1
percent. The percentage of total ﬁscal costs raised by seigniorage falls from
83.4 percent to 35.9 percent, while the importance of debt deﬂation falls
from 16.6 percent to 13.1 percent. Even though nonindexed government
spending represents only 2 percent of GDP, the implicit ﬁscal reform pays
for over 50 percent of the cost of the crisis.15
Allowing for debt deﬂation and implicit ﬁscal reform can render our
model consistent with the observation that inﬂation rates are often moder-
ate after a currency crisis. However, these extensions cannot explain the
other shortcoming of the benchmark model: actual inﬂation is often much
lower than the rate of devaluation associated with a currency crisis. We turn
to this challenge next.
7.4.2 Deviations from Purchasing Power Parity
Up to this point, all of the models that we have considered assume that
PPP holds. Consequently, by construction, the rate of inﬂation coincides
with the rate of devaluation. To break the link between domestic inﬂation
and exchange rate depreciation we introduce two departures from PPP into
the model described in section 7.4.1: (a) nontradable goods and (b) costs of
distributing tradable goods (e.g., transportation, wholesaling, and retailing).
Nontradable Goods
In the presence of nontradable goods the consumer price index (CPI), P t
is given by
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15. To assess the robustness of our results we redid our calculations assuming that G is ﬁxed
in nominal terms for only ﬁve months. In this case, the implicit ﬁscal reform raises 33 percent
of the total ﬁscal cost of the crisis. In this experiment the value of t∗ is 0.57. The rate of inﬂa-




NT denotes the price of nontradable goods and Pt
T the price of trad-
able goods. By assumption PPP holds for tradable goods, so Pt
T   St for all
t. Absent an explicit model of the nontradable goods sector, we assume that
Pt
NT remains ﬁxed for the ﬁrst ﬁve months after the currency crisis. There-
after Pt
NT moves one-to-one with the exchange rate. Consequently, a cur-
rency crisis is associated with a permanent decline in the relative price of
nontradable goods. This assumption is motivated by the Korean experi-
ence. The price of nontradables in Korea increased by only 4.8 percent be-
tween October 1997 and April 1998, whereas it increased only by 5.6 per-
cent between October 1997 and October 1998. Finally, we set   0.5, which
corresponds to the share of tradables in Korea’s CPI.16
Because we deﬁned mtas Mt/St, equation (19) remains unchanged. Equa-
tion (11) describes the evolution of the CPI. Equations (11) and (20), to-
gether with the path for Pt
NT, determine the behavior of the exchange rate.
The equilibrium values of t∗ and   can be computed using equations (16)
and (19).
Table 7.2 indicates that these modiﬁcations of the model have two eﬀects.
First, there is a relatively small decline in the amount of inﬂation induced
by a currency crisis. Inﬂation is 17.7 percent in the ﬁrst year after the crisis,
while steady-state inﬂation is 4.0 percent. Second, and more importantly,
the model now generates a large wedge between the initial rate of inﬂation
and the rate of depreciation. Speciﬁcally, the currency crisis is now associ-
ated with a 35.4 percent rate of depreciation in the ﬁrst year.
Distribution Costs
To induce an even larger wedge between inﬂation and depreciation we
now allow for distribution costs in tradable goods. Proceeding as in Bur-
stein, Neves, and Rebelo (2001) we assume that   units of nontradables
(transportation, wholesale, and retail) are required to distribute tradable
goods. As in their paper, we assume that PPP holds for the import prices but
not for the retail prices of tradable goods. The latter are given by Pt
T  Pt
NT,
so that the CPI is
P t   (St    Pt
NT) (Pt
NT)1  .
The last line of table 7.2 displays results for this version of the model un-
der the assumption that   1.17 Figure 7.2 depicts the paths for the ex-
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16. This information was obtained from the Annual Report on the Consumer Price Index,Na-
tional Statistical Oﬃce, Republic of Korea, 1998. Food; fuel; light and water; furniture and
utensils; clothing and footwear; cigarettes; and toilet articles were classiﬁed as tradable goods.
Medical care; education; culture and recreation; transportation and communication; and per-
sonal care services were classiﬁed as nontradables.
17. This value of   is consistent with the evidence presented in Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo
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Fig. 7.2 Solutions from the model with sticky nontradables prices, distribution
costs, and an implicit ﬁscal reform: A, CPI and exchange rate; B, money balances
Notes: Time measured in years. Initial money balances are normalized to equal 1.
AB
change rate, the price level, and the money supply. Notice the stark diﬀer-
ence between this model and the benchmark model discussed in section 7.3.
In the benchmark model, inﬂation in the ﬁrst year after the crisis is equal
to 34.9 percent and declines to 20 percent in steady state. In addition, the
rate of devaluation coincides with the rate of inﬂation. In contrast, the
modiﬁed model implies ﬁrst-year inﬂation roughly equal to 14 percent,
while the currency devalues by over 50 percent. Moreover, steady-state in-
ﬂation is only 1 percent. Clearly this version of the model can account for
large devaluations without generating grossly counterfactual implications
for inﬂation.
7.5 Two Case Studies
We now examine in some detail two recent crises, Mexico 1994 and Ko-
rea 1997, and discuss how the governments in these countries are paying for
the ﬁscal costs associated with the crises. Our calculations suggest that
Mexico will ﬁnance most of the ﬁscal costs associated with its crisis through
seigniorage revenues. In contrast, our best guess for Korea is that it will pay
for the bulk of the ﬁscal cost of its crisis through future explicit and implicit
ﬁscal reforms.
7.5.1 The Government Budget Constraint Revisited
Up to now, we have abstracted from output growth and foreign inﬂation.
To interpret the data we must amend the government budget constraint in
equation (6) to incorporate these elements. To this end, suppose that do-
mestic output and the U.S. price level grow at constant rates   and  ∗, re-
spectively. We normalize the U.S. price level at t   0 to one. Consequently,
Pt ∗ evolves according to 
Pt ∗   e ∗t.The presence of output growth and foreign inﬂation implies that, in a sus-
tainable ﬁxed exchange rate regime, real balances grow at rate  , and do-
mestic inﬂation,  , is equal to  ∗. It also implies that the government can
collect seigniorage under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. To see this, it is con-
venient to focus on the benchmark model. Given PPP, the demand for real
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Finally, the new version of the government budget constraint in equation
(6) is














i  e (r  ∗)i   (    ∗)  
M
P 0





   
B
S














t      
X
St
t   e (r  ∗)tdt .
The key implication of equation (21) is that not all of the seigniorage col-
lected in the postcrisis period [ 
0
 (M ˙
t/St)e–(r  ∗)tdt   Σi I( Mi/Si)e–(r  ∗)i]
contributes to ﬁnancing the crisis. Part of those revenues [(    ∗)(M0/P 0)/
(r –  )] would have been collected under the ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
These revenues were required to fulﬁll the government’s precrisis budget
constraint. Only the diﬀerence between the seigniorage collected in the
presence of the crisis and the hypothetical seigniorage that would have been
collected in the absence of the crisis can be used to ﬁnance the new spend-
ing,  . Inevitably, some assumptions are required to compute this hypo-
thetical seigniorage.
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Figure 7.3 displays four quarterly series for the period 1993 to 2000: the
peso/dollar exchange rate, the CPI, and the export and import price deﬂa-
tors. Between 20 December and 31 December 1994 the peso-dollar ex-
change rate increased by 44 percent. By 2 January 1996 the cumulative in-
crease in the peso-dollar exchange rate reached 121 percent. Although the
export and import price indices moved closely with the exchange rate, the
rate of CPI inﬂation was much lower than the rate of depreciation.
The currency crisis exacerbated an ongoing banking crisis.18 The net re-
sult was a large rise in the Mexican government’s prospective deﬁcits asso-
ciated with an impending bank bailout. Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996)
estimate the ﬁscal cost of the crisis to be 6.5 percent of GDP, which amounts
to 27 billion dollars. On the other hand, Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) esti-
mate the cost to be between 12 and 15 percent of GDP, with the upper
bound translating into 63 billion dollars. More recently, Caprio and Klinge-
biel have revised their estimate to 20 percent of GDP. This corresponds to
84.3 billion dollars.19
In what follows we provide a rough estimate of what the Mexican gov-
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18. Diﬃculties associated with rolling over short-run dollar-denominated debt no doubt
played some role in the exact timing of the crisis. Here we are more concerned with under-
standing how the ﬁscal costs of the crisis were ﬁnanced. See Krueger and Tornell (1999) and
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996) for detailed discussions of the Mexico 1994 crisis.
19. We use 1994 GDP to compute the dollar amounts.
Fig. 7.3 Price indices in Mexico 1993–2000 (1994:3   100)
Source: The consumer price index is from Hacienda. The import and export deﬂators are
from the Mexican national accounts (Hacienda).
Notes: All series are normalized so that their value in 1994:3   100 by creating a new series
Qt   100P t/P 1994:3. The peso/$ spot rate is the IFS period-average market rate (AF . . . ZF).ernment has done to date to ﬁnance its ﬁscal costs. In addition, we discuss
what the future growth rate of money would have to be to ﬁnance the re-
mainder of the costs.
Seigniorage Revenues
We begin by discussing the seigniorage revenues raised by the Mexican
government in the postcrisis period. Using monthly data on the monetary
base we computed the present value of the seigniorage collected between
November 1994 and December 2000.20 The ﬂows of seigniorage were dis-
counted with a dollar interest rate R∗   0.065.21 Under our assumptions,
the present value in 1994 of the seigniorage revenue collected between No-
vember 1994 and December 2000 was 20.2 billion dollars.
To calculate the part of this seigniorage that can be used to cover the ﬁs-
cal costs of the crisis, we must compute the hypothetical seigniorage that
Mexico would have collected during this period had the crisis not occurred.
We compute the present value in 1994, measured in dollars, of this hypo-
thetical seigniorage ﬂow by making two assumptions. First, in the absence
of the crisis, the growth rate of money from 1994 on would have been con-
stant and equal to the average year-on-year growth rate of the monetary
base in the period January 1989 to November 1994. This equals 18 percent
per annum.22 Second, the demand for real balances measured in dollars,
Mt/St, would have grown at the average growth rate of output from 1980 to
2000 (roughly   0.027). This implies that the present value of hypotheti-
cal seigniorage that would have been collected between November 1994
(time zero) and December 2000 is 13.9 billion dollars.23 Thus, the net in-
crease in seigniorage revenues collected up to December 2000 that can be
used to ﬁnance the ﬁscal cost of the crisis is 6.3 billion dollars.
Debt Devaluation
At the end of September 1994 the government owed 138.7 billion pesos’
worth of securitized debt and 10.1 billion pesos of nonsecuritized debt. Be-
cause we have no information on the indexation provisions of nonsecuri-
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20. We used the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database. The series we used for the
monetary base is 14 . . . ZF, Reserve Money. This diﬀers slightly from the Banco de Mexico’s
series for deﬁnitional reasons.
21. The average dollar return on twenty-eight day Mexican treasury peso-denominated se-
curities was 6.5 percent from December 1994 to December 2000. This rate of return is similar
to U.S. rates of interest. The average one-year U.S. Treasury bill yield from December 1994 to
January 2000 was roughly 5.5 percent. So was the thirty-year zero-coupon yield estimated
by J.  Huston McCulloch for February 2001 and reported at [http://www.econ.ohiostate.
edu/jhm/ts/ts.html].
22. This corresponds to a continuously compounded rate   0.166.
23. This was computed using the formula  (M0/S0) [1– e–(R∗– )h]/(R∗–  ), where M0and S0are
the November 1994 values of the monetary base and exchange rate and h 6.083 (the number
of years between November 1994 and December 2000).tized debt, we adopted the conservative assumption that all of it was in-
dexed. The securitized debt can be broken down into the following cate-
gories. Cetes, which are zero-coupon Mexican Treasury bills, represented
34 percent of securitized debt. Tesobonos, which are dollar-denominated
zero-coupon bonds, represented 33 percent. Ajustabonos, which are inﬂa-
tion-indexed coupon bonds, represented 21 percent. Bondes, which are ad-
justable coupon bonds, represent 12 percent. To simplify, we treated both
bondesand tesobonosas if they were perfectly indexed to the dollar. To com-
pute the revenue in dollars generated by the debt deﬂation we considered
only cetes,which are not indexed, and ajustabonos,which are indexed to the
CPI, not to the dollar.
We consolidated the securitized debt of the government and the central
bank. We only have information on the composition of securities held by
the central bank for the end of 1994. At this time the Banco de Mexico held
2.5 billion pesos of cetes and held a negative position of 0.5 billion pesos in
ajustabonos.
To compute the reduction in the dollar value of the outstanding Cetes in
the aftermath of the crisis, we assumed that these bonds were distributed
equally across four maturities: one, three, six, and twelve months. Within
each maturity we assumed that the bonds were distributed equally across all
possible expiration dates.24 Consider a cetes of a given maturity and expira-
tion date that was outstanding at date t. We compute its loss in dollar value
between dates t and t   1 as F/St – F/St 1, where F is the face value in pesos
and St is the peso-dollar exchange rate at time t. We make similar assump-
tions with regard to ajustabonos, which come in maturities of three and ﬁve
years. Speciﬁcally, we compute the loss in dollar value between dates t and
t   1 as F t/St – F t 1/St 1, where F t   F t–1P t/P t–1 and P t is the CPI at date t.
These assumptions imply that the total revenue generated by debt deﬂa-
tion was 8.4 billion dollars. Most of this revenue (90 percent) was generated
in the ﬁrst month after the devaluation. This means that our calculations
are not very sensitive to our timing assumptions about maturities and expi-
ration dates.
Implicit and Explicit Fiscal Reform
Despite several changes in the tax code, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd evidence of
large explicit or implicit ﬁscal reforms.25 According to Burnside (2000), the
average cyclically adjusted primary surplus was 3.5 percent of GDP in the
precrisis period 1991–94.26 In the period 1995:1–1998:2 the average cycli-
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24. In other words, for the three-month maturity we assumed that one third of the cetes
would expire within one, two, and three months, respectively.
25. Fiscal reforms included an increase in the general value-added tax rate from 10 to 15 per-
cent, as well as increases in the prices of public goods and services in 1995.
26. These estimates incorporate the impact of changes in the price of oil on Mexico’s ﬁscal
situation. See Kletzer (1997) for a discussion of the ﬁscal implications of external shocks.cally adjusted primary surplus was 4.2 percent of GDP. These estimates
suggest that overall the net eﬀect of any ﬁscal reform was small.27
Here, using a simple methodology described in the appendix, we decom-
pose the primary budget surplus,  t, into three components,
(22)  t    t   (  ˆ
t    t)   ( t    ˆ
t),
where  t is the primary ﬁscal surplus that would have occurred in the ab-
sence of any crisis, and   ˆ
t is the cyclically adjusted primary surplus. We de-
scribe the second term on the right-hand side of equation (22) as the ﬁscal
reform component, and the third term is the cost-of-recession component.
We estimate that ﬁscal reforms (  ˆ
t–  t) generated roughly 5.8 billion dol-
lars in additional funds for the government. Because the nominal value of
the Mexican government’s nonindexed liabilities quickly began to rise after
the crises, most of these reforms were explicit rather than implicit. We esti-
mate the recession costs ( t –   ˆ
t) to have been about 2.2 billion dollars.
Summary of What Has Been Done to Date
Adding up additional seigniorage (6.3 billion dollars), the revenue from
debt devaluation (8.4 billion dollars), and the revenue from the ﬁscal re-
forms, net of recession costs (3.5 billion dollars), we estimate that, to date,
the Mexican government has raised 18.2 billion dollars. This corresponds
to 4.3 percent of 1994 Mexican GDP, which is close to Lindgren, Garcia,
and Saal’s (1996) estimate of the size of the crisis. If one accepts this esti-
mate, the Mexican government has almost ﬁnished paying for the ﬁscal
costs of the crisis. However, if one accepts Caprio and Klingebiel’s (1996)
estimates, much is left to be done.
Financing the Remaining Costs
Absent any indication of large impending ﬁscal reforms, it seems reason-
able to suppose that the remainder of the ﬁscal costs will be paid for with
seigniorage revenues. We estimate that the monetary base would have to
grow at an annual rate of 21.2 percent, from 2001 on, to raise the additional
10.6 percent of GDP required to ﬁnance a crisis of the size estimated by
Caprio and Klingebiel (1996).
We arrived at this number as follows. First, we estimated the seigniorage
that would have been collected absent a crisis from January 2001 onward.
We used the same assumptions that we employed to estimate hypothetical
seigniorage for the period November 1994 to December 2000. These as-
sumptions imply that the Mexican government would have raised seignior-
age with a present value in 1994 equal to 55.9 billion dollars. Second, we es-
timated the present value (as of 1994) of the seigniorage revenues resulting
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27. These calculations take into account the decline in the real value of taxes due to inﬂa-
tion, known as the Tanzi eﬀect.from a constant growth rate of the monetary base from January 2001 on-
ward. Here we assumed that the growth rate of real balances measured in
dollars would be equal to the historical average growth rate of real GDP
from 1980 to 2000 (2.7 percent) and that the dollar interest rate would be
6.5 percent. Given these assumptions, a growth rate of the nominal base
equal to 21.2 percent yields a present value of hypothetical seigniorage
equal to 100.9 billion dollars. Thus, the extra seigniorage that can be used
to pay for the crisis would equal 45.0 billion dollars (100.9–55.9). This is
equivalent to 10.6 percent of 1994 GDP.
We emphasize that our estimate of the required growth rate of money is
sensitive to the assumptions underlying our calculations. For example, if
Mexico grows more quickly or the dollar interest rate is lower than we as-
sumed, then the government will be able to cover the ﬁscal costs of the cri-
sis with lower future money growth rates.
The key point is that, absent any sign of ﬁscal reforms, it seems quite
likely that the bulk of the costs will be covered via explicit seigniorage rev-
enues. This implies that the rate of inﬂation in Mexico is higher than it
would have been had the implicit ﬁscal reform or the initial domestic debt
been larger. We use our model to illustrate this point more concretely in the
case of Korea, which we turn to next.
7.5.3 Korea, 1997
Figure 7.4 displays four quarterly series for the period 1996–2000: the
won-dollar exchange rate, the CPI, and the export and import price indexes.
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Fig. 7.4 Price indices in Korea 1996–2000 (1997:3   100)
Source: The consumer price index (CPI), export price index (EPI), and import price index
(IPI) are all from the Bank of Korea website.
Notes: All series are normalized that their value in 1997:3   100 by creating a new series Qt
  100P t/P 1997:3. The won/$ spot rate is the IFS period-average market rate (AF . . . ZF).Between September 1997 and September 1998 the won-dollar exchange rate
increased by 52.1 percent. Figure 7.4 shows that although the export and
import price indexes moved closely with the exchange rate, CPI inﬂation
was signiﬁcantly lower than the rate of depreciation. Between September
1997 and September 1998 the CPI increased by just 6.9 percent.
As in Mexico, the currency crisis in Korea exacerbated existing problems
in the banking system. As of December 1999, Standard and Poor’s ratings
service estimated that the ﬁscal cost of the banking crisis would be roughly
24 percent of GDP. In terms of 1997 GDP, this corresponds to 114.4 billion
dollars.
In what follows we provide rough estimates of what the Korean govern-
ment has done to date to ﬁnance the ﬁscal costs of the crisis. We then dis-
cuss the implications of alternative strategies for ﬁnancing the remainder of
the costs.
Seigniorage Revenues
Using monthly data on the monetary base and a dollar interest rate of 5.5
percent, we estimate that the present value of the seigniorage raised be-
tween October 1997 and October 2000 is equal to 5.6 billion dollars.
To  compute the hypothetical seigniorage that the government would
have raised absent a crisis we make several assumptions. First, in the ab-
sence of the crisis, the growth rate of money from late 1997 on would have
been constant and equal to the average year-on-year growth rate of the
monetary base in the period October 1993–October 1997. This equals 0.6
percent per annum (  0.006). Second, the demand for real balances in
dollar terms would have grown at the average growth rate of output from
1980 to 1999. This equals 7.3 percent (  0.07). These assumptions imply
that the present value of hypothetical seigniorage that would have been col-
lected between October 1997 and October 2000 is 0.4 billion dollars. Thus,
the net increase in seigniorage revenues collected up to October 2000 that
can be used to ﬁnance the ﬁscal cost of the crisis is 5.2 billion dollars.
Debt Devaluation
In Korea, as in Mexico, not all domestic public-sector debt is securitized.
Because we know very little about the indexation of nonsecuritized debt we
adopted the conservative assumption that all of it was indexed. We focus
narrowly on the following securities: government bonds and monetary sta-
bilization bonds issued by the central bank. The outstanding amounts of
these two types of bonds at the end of December 1996 were, respectively,
25.7 and 25.0 trillion won.28 In addition the central bank held government
bonds worth 2.1 trillion won. Consequently, we assume that the securitized
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28. For the ﬁgures on government bonds, see IMF (2000). For central bank debt and hold-
ings of treasury securities, see the Bank of Korea website.debt was equal to 48.6 trillion won (25.7   25.0 – 2.1). We use this Decem-
ber 1996 measure of the stock of debt to benchmark the stock of debt in Oc-
tober 1997.
We know much less about the maturity structure of Korean debt than we
do about Mexican debt. Korean treasury bonds are issued in maturities of
one, three, or ﬁve years.29Monetary stabilization bonds are issued with ma-
turities between fourteen days and eighteen months. If we assume average
expiration dates between six months and eighteen months across all types
of bonds, we obtain estimates of the amount of debt devaluation ranging
from 13.7 to 16.4 billion dollars. Over this range, the estimate is actually de-
creasing in the average maturity of the bonds due to the rebound in the
value of the won after January 1998.
Implicit and Explicit Fiscal Reform
The Korean government appears to have implemented a combination of
explicit and implicit ﬁscal reforms. On the explicit side, tax revenue has re-
cently risen sharply relative to GDP. This suggests that either tax rates have
been raised, the tax base has expanded, or that enforcement has been im-
proved. On the implicit side, the won value of expenditures has risen very
slowly since the crisis. For example, the public-sector wage bill actually de-
clined slightly between 1997 and 1999 in won terms, representing a 6 billion
dollar saving to the government over two years. Of course, we cannot be cer-
tain whether such savings were implicit—the result of contracts set in nom-
inal terms—or explicit—via job losses or ex post wage freezes.
Using the same methodology as for Mexico, we put the present value of
implicit and explicit ﬁscal reforms at roughly 34.4 billion dollars. Set
against these gains are losses of 24.7 billion dollars in tax revenue due to the
recession.
Summary of What Has Been Done to Date
Adding up additional seigniorage (5.2 billion dollars), the revenue from
debt devaluation (13.7 billion dollars), and the revenue from ﬁscal reforms
(34.4 billion dollars) net of recession costs (24.7 billion dollars), we obtain
a total of 28.6 billion dollars. This corresponds to 6 percent of Korea’s 1997
GDP. Because our estimate of the ﬁscal cost of the crisis is 24 percent of
1997 GDP, or 114.4 billion dollars, this leaves a shortfall of 85.8 billion dol-
lars that must be raised in the future. This ﬁgure is close to the amount of
new debt issued by the Korean government via the Korea Asset Manage-
ment Corporation and the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation and in
other forms since 1997. In present value terms, this new debt is worth about
82 billion dollars.
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29. The government has established the three-year bond as a benchmark in the postcrisis
period.Financing the Remainder of the Fiscal Cost
To ﬁnance the remainder of the ﬁscal cost, Korea could use a combina-
tion of further ﬁscal reforms and increased seigniorage. Suppose that the
government raised all of the required revenue via seigniorage. What kind of
monetary policy would they have to pursue in the future? To answer this
question we make two assumptions. First, the growth rate of money from
October 2000 equals 16.8 percent per annum. This is the average money
growth rate between October 1998 and October 2000.30 Second, from Oc-
tober 2000 on, real balances grow at 7.3 percent per annum. This is the av-
erage annual growth rate of real GDP between 1980 and October 2000. Un-
der these assumptions Korea could raise the additional seigniorage it
requires in roughly twenty-two years. From the standpoint of our model,
this scenario seems unlikely because inﬂation would have been much higher
than it actually is. Our model suggests that a more plausible scenario is that
the government will raise the remainder of the revenue it needs through a
combination of future implicit and explicit reforms and a very moderate
amount of seigniorage.
To show this, we ask the question: how big does the future explicit reform
have to be to rationalize Korea’s postcrisis inﬂation experience? Various ex-
periments with our model suggest that the answer is roughly 16 percent of
GDP or 66.7 percent of the ﬁscal cost of the crisis.31 Table 7.3 summarizes
the key features of the equilibrium path of the model economy under this as-
sumption. This example has a number of striking features. It is consistent
with the observation that, one year after the crisis, inﬂation in Korea became
extremely low. In the model the steady-state rate of inﬂation (attained after
the ﬁrst year) is 1.6 percent. Overall seigniorage only accounts for 10.6 per-
cent of the cost of the crisis. Nevertheless, the model generates a realistically
large depreciation of the won in the ﬁrst year of the crisis (59.9 percent).
Understanding the Properties of the Extended Model
The ability of our model to rationalize large rates of devaluation along
with moderate inﬂation is due to three features. First, even though seignior-
age plays a small role in government ﬁnance, inﬂation-related revenue in-
cludes the value of the implicit ﬁscal reform and debt devaluation as well as
seigniorage. Together these three sources of revenue account for roughly
one third of the ﬁscal cost of the crisis. Eliminating the ﬁrst two revenue
sources and relying exclusively on seigniorage would result in substantially
larger rates of inﬂation. In particular, inﬂation in the ﬁrst year would jump
to 20 percent and steady-state inﬂation would exceed 6 percent. Second,
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30. At the end of October 2000, the value of Korea’s stock of base money was about 24.3 bil-
lion dollars.
31. In these experiments we set G   0.003 so that the fraction of the ﬁscal cost ﬁnanced by
the implicit reform is roughly 12 percent.distribution costs play a key role in magnifying the rate of depreciation. To
see this, suppose that we eliminate distribution costs (  0). Then the de-
preciation in the ﬁrst year would only equal 32 percent instead of 59.9 per-
cent. Inﬂation in the ﬁrst year would rise to over 15 percent, and steady-
state inﬂation would climb to 1.6 percent. If we also eliminate nontradables
(    0), the model implies that the rate of depreciation in the ﬁrst year
is roughly 16 percent. Because PPP holds in this version of the model, the
rate of inﬂation coincides with the depreciation rate. Finally, the model as-
sumes that there is a period of very rapid money growth at some point after
the crisis. This is captured by the assumption that there is a discrete increase
in the money supply at T   1.32 If this money injection did not occur, then
the rate of depreciation in the ﬁrst year would be only 8.3 percent, a num-
ber far lower than observed in the data. We conclude that nonseigniorage
inﬂation-related revenue, distribution costs, nontradable goods, and short-
run monetization all play important roles in allowing the model to generate
large rates of depreciation along with moderate inﬂation.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of some of the model’s
empirical shortcomings. The most obvious is that it signiﬁcantly overstates
inﬂation in the ﬁrst year after the crisis. The model predicts inﬂation on the
order of 15 percent, whereas actual inﬂation in Korea was roughly 7 per-
cent. This problem may reﬂect (a) the fact that we abstracted from the se-
vere recession that occurred in Korea after the crisis, (b) the presence of
measurement problems in the Korean CPI,33 and (c) the fact that the prices
of many nontradable services like medical care and education are con-
trolled by the government.34 In ongoing work Burstein, Eichenbaum, and
On the Fiscal Implications of Twin Crises 213
Table 7.3 Results for Numerical Example, Explicit Fiscal Reform (16% of GDP)
Financing (% of Total)
Nominal Implicit Explicit
Long Debt Fiscal Fiscal
Yr 1 Yr 2 Run Yr 1 Yr 2 t* Seigniorage Deﬂation Reform Reform
14.8 1.6 1.6 59.9 1.6 0.64 10.6 11.0 11.7 66.7
Inﬂation
Devaluation
32. Recall that the value of   used in our example was motivated by Korean data. Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001) discuss the patterns of money growth across diﬀerent coun-
tries in the aftermath of the Asian currency crisis.
33. Devaluations may lead to a ﬂight from quality as agents substitute away from imported
items to lower-quality, locally produced substitutes. The methods used in Korea to choose the
brands included in the CPI and the treatment of items that are no longer available may lead
measured inﬂation to signiﬁcantly understate actual inﬂation.
34. According to the 1998 Annual Report on the Consumer Price Index (National Statistical
Oﬃce, Republic of Korea), the weight of government controlled prices in the Korean CPI is
20.8 percent. This includes goods and services in the following categories: medical care (5.1
percent), education (9.2 percent), culture and recreation services (3.4 percent), and public
transportation (3.1 percent).Rebelo (2001) use disaggregated CPI data to explore the quantitative im-
portance of these factors.
A ﬁnal shortcoming of the model is that it does not account for the diﬀer-
ent patterns of depreciation in Korea and Mexico. As is evident from ﬁgures
7.3 and 7.4, the Korean exchange rate displays a strong overshooting pat-
tern that is completely absent in the Mexican case.35 Understanding this
diﬀerence strikes us as an important area for future research.
7.6 Conclusion
This paper explored the implications of diﬀerent strategies for ﬁnancing
the ﬁscal costs of twin crises for inﬂation and depreciation rates. We do this
using a ﬁrst-generation-type model of speculative attacks that has four key
features. First, the currency crisis is triggered by prospective deﬁcits. Sec-
ond, there exists outstanding nonindexed government debt whose real
value can be reduced through a devaluation. Third, some governments’ lia-
bilities are not indexed to inﬂation, and their real value declines after a cur-
rency crises. Fourth, there are nontradable goods and costs of distributing
tradable goods, so that PPP does not hold.
We use our model and the data to interpret the recent currency crises in
Mexico and Korea. Our analysis suggests that the Mexican government is
likely to pay for the bulk of the ﬁscal costs of its crisis through seigniorage
revenues. As a consequence, rates of inﬂation have been relatively high. We
anticipate that inﬂation will continue to be high in the future. In contrast,
the Korean government is likely to rely more on a combination of implicit
and explicit ﬁscal reforms. Under this assumption our model can account
for both the large devaluation of the Korean won in 1997 and the fact that
current rates of inﬂation in Korea are extremely low.
Appendix
Estimating the Size of Fiscal Reforms
Our procedure for computing the size of the ﬁscal adjustment after a crisis
consists of two main ingredients:
1. Estimating the cyclically adjusted primary budget surplus.
2. Estimating what the budget surplus would have been in the absence of
the crisis.
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35. The Thai baht exhibited an overshooting pattern similar to that of the Korean won.Estimating the Cyclically Adjusted Budget Surplus
Deﬁne the standard measure of the primary budget surplus as  t   Rt –
Et, where Rt is revenue and Et is primary expenditure. A cyclically adjusted
measure of the primary surplus is   ˆ
t R ˆ
t– E ˆ
t, where R ˆ
tand E ˆ
tare cyclically
adjusted measures of Rt and Et.
Standard procedures for computing cyclically adjusted revenue and ex-
penditure dictate that there are speciﬁc revenue and expenditure compo-
nents that adjust automatically to the business cycle, whereas there are oth-
ers that only move according to the government’s discretion. To illustrate,
suppose there are K revenue categories, of which K1 adjust according to the



















it is the ith cyclically adjusted revenue component. Note that some
revenue categories are not adjusted because they are deemed to be purely
discretionary or at least invariant to the business cycle. Typically, tax rev-
enues and transfers to households are the types of categories that are cycli-
cally adjusted. An adjusted revenue category would typically be estimated
as
R ˆ
it   Ritexp[  i(lnY t   lnY   t)],
where ln Y   t is some measure of trend real GDP, and  i is a measure of the
elasticity of this category of revenue with respect to the output gap, ln Y t –
ln Y Y   t.
In developing countries it is typical for tax revenue to move closely in pro-
portion to GDP, whereas few if any of the expenditure categories exhibit a
strong elasticity with respect to GDP. Motivated by this fact, and to sim-




t   [Rt/(P tY t)]P tY Y   t, where P t represents the GDP deﬂator. In other
words, we assume that all changes in the ratio of revenue to GDP are dis-
cretionary. Thus, we have   ˆ
t   Rt(Y Y   t/Y t) – Et. To obtain trend GDP we ﬁt a
linear trend to data on the logarithm of real GDP from 1980 to 2000.
The part of the budget surplus due to the business cycle is  t –   ˆ
t.
The Budget Surplus in the Absence of the Crisis
We denote the budget surplus in the absence of the crisis by    t. We let    t
 dP tY Y   t, where dis the average primary surplus (as a fraction of GDP) in an
On the Fiscal Implications of Twin Crises 215N-year window prior to the crisis. We set N   4 so that for Mexico the win-
dow is 1991–94, and for Korea it is 1994–97.
The Size of the Fiscal Reform
Suppose we have observed government ﬁnance data for H years after the
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where St is the local currency–dollar exchange rate and R is the assumed
dollar interest rate.
Recession Costs
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Decomposition of the Budget Surplus
Our decomposition of the budget data means that
 t     t   (  ˆ
t     t)   ( t    ˆ
t),
where the ﬁrst component is the trend, the second is the ﬁscal reform, and
the last is the cyclical.
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Comment Kenneth Kletzer
This is a very well-done paper that leaves little for a discussant to criticize.
The authors set out a useful task, address it in an appropriate and interest-
ing manner, and present the analysis in a very readable way. I will ﬁrst sum-
marize the paper as I interpret the problem and the analysis. I will then
place it in the context of the literature on ﬁnancial crises and ﬁnally turn my
attention to some possible modiﬁcations that may help relate the model bet-
ter to its motivation.
The object of the paper is to set up a model of the ﬁscal costs of a cur-
rency and domestic banking crisis that can be calibrated and compared to
the ﬁscal responses of the governments of some crisis countries. The ﬁscal
costs include contingent deposit guarantee liabilities of the government,
whether explicit or implicit, that are realized as the result of a banking cri-
sis. These liabilities can include cumulative losses of the banking system be-
fore the collapse of an exchange rate peg as well as the balance sheet costs
for the banks of the devaluation itself. The primary point made by the au-
thors is that governments have a number of ﬁscal instruments available for
meeting the increase in public-sector liabilities consequent to a twin crisis
and do not need to resort only to conventional seigniorage revenues in the
aftermath of a collapsing exchange rate regime. To motivate their analysis
of the mix of ﬁscal measures that might be used by the government, the au-
thors argue that postcrisis inﬂation rates in several countries suﬀering cur-
rency and banking crisis in recent years have been inconsistent with the
rates of domestic credit growth that would be needed to ﬁll the budgetary
gap alone. They further argue that sizes of crisis devaluations have exceeded
those that would be predicted by simple currency crisis models given subse-
quent rates of monetization and inﬂation.
The centerpiece of the model is the intertemporal budget constraint of
the consolidated government. Prior to a currency crisis, the exchange rate is
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Kenneth Kletzer is professor of economics at the University of California, Santa Cruz.ﬁxed, but private agents suddenly learn that future government liabilities
are higher than anticipated. The implication that the rate of domestic credit
creation will rise in the future leads to the eventual collapse of the exchange
rate peg. This is essentially the ﬁrst-generation model of a currency crisis as
in Krugman (1979) with the modiﬁcation that the rate of domestic credit
growth rises at some predetermined date. The shadow exchange rises as the
date of eventual monetization approaches until it reaches the ﬁxed rate and
the speculative attack occurs. The timing of the attack and the postcrisis
rate of depreciation vary with the extent to which future increases in public-
sector liabilities are monetized (after the sudden news that deﬁcits will rise
in the future, agents have perfect foresight in the model). The public-sector
budget constraint highlights the alternative means available to the govern-
ment for ﬁnancing a sudden rise in transfer payments. These include mon-
etization, deﬂation of nominally indexed public debt, default on public
debt, and increases in the real primary surplus of the government.
The model of a currency crisis used here is the prospective deﬁcits version
by the authors (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2001). The idea that
anticipated future monetization of public-sector budget deficits can bring
about the collapse of an exchange rate peg has been used in other applica-
tions of the ﬁrst-generation currency crisis models. For example, it appears
in the analysis of borrowed reserves in Buiter (1987), of the quasi-ﬁscal
costs of sterilization in Calvo (1991) and of reserve accumulation as self-
protection against crises in Kletzer and Mody (2000). In the basic ﬁrst-
generation models, the assumption that domestic credit grows at a constant
rate before and after the speculative attack is inessential. However, the
prospective deﬁcits version of this model may help to explain the empirics
of recent ﬁnancial crises without resorting to a multiplicity of equilibria,
just as intended by the authors. I ﬁnd this a compelling reason to add ﬁscal
policy detail to the model and compare the calibrated model to the data.
One potential criticism of the model is that a portion of the prospective
deﬁcits is created by the currency collapse itself. For example, the ﬁscal
costs of a banking-sector bailout can be exacerbated by the balance sheet
eﬀects of a devaluation when banks have borrowed in foreign currency and
lent in domestic currency. The realization of public-sector liabilities contin-
gent on the collapse of the exchange rate regime can lead to multiple equi-
libria, just as in the second generation of currency crisis models.1 However,
contingent liabilities associated with the deterioration of a fragile domestic
ﬁnancial system can lead to a progressive rise in government liabilities fol-
lowing capital account liberalization, resulting in the eventual collapse of
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1. Public-sector liabilities that are contingent on devaluation underlie the logic of a third
generation of currency crisis models. The role of contingent liabilities for generating crises has
been emphasized recently by Calvo (1998), Dooley (2000), and others, following up the obser-
vations and ideas of Diaz-Alejandro (1985).an exchange rate peg with certainty. This process was identiﬁed and its im-
portance so well emphasized by Carlos Diaz-Alejandro (1985).2
In the model, prospective deﬁcits are assumed to be nonconditional in
the analysis, even though the postcrisis increase in government liabilities
has been contingent on the regime collapse in recent episodes. The paper
uses estimates of the cost of domestic ﬁnancial bailouts that account for the
impact of devaluation on the net liabilities of the government associated
with banking crises. There are two eﬀects of devaluation—a rise in nominal
deposit insurance and other liabilities due to exacerbation of an ongoing
banking crisis, and the decrease in the real value of the cost of public
bailouts of the ﬁnancial sector. The estimates of the impact of devaluation
in the case of Mexico and Korea in the paper give net increases in govern-
ment liabilities, so that the possibility of multiple equilibria cannot be dis-
missed.
Turning to the argument that ex post inﬂation was inconsistent with the
rate of depreciation following crises, the authors introduce nontraded
goods to allow relative price changes to explain part of the nominal depre-
ciation of the currency. They also add distribution costs to the domestic
price of tradable goods. The retail sale of tradable goods requires an input
of nontradable goods. These two assumptions are realistic and put a wedge
between the domestic rate of inﬂation and the nominal rate of depreciation.
In the theoretical model, this acts in the correct direction, allowing a de-
preciation that exceeds inﬂation. As we look at ﬁgure 7.3, however, we see
that the rate of inﬂation for Mexico adjusts to the rate of depreciation of the
peso over a three-year horizon. Indeed, from the crisis in December 1994 to
the middle of 1997 and thereafter, we see that the CPI and the peso-dollar
spot rate converge. I believe that the data portrayed in the ﬁgure suggests
sluggish nominal price adjustment in Mexico with only a temporary real
depreciation following the crisis.
We see a diﬀerent time series relationship between the nominal exchange
rate and the rate of domestic inﬂation following the Korean crisis in ﬁgure
7.4. Data for Thailand generate an analogous picture. The rise and fall in
the won price of the dollar are not explained by the dynamics of relative
prices in the model, but perhaps an interpretation (within the conﬁnes of
the paper) is that private actors were uncertain about the eventual policy re-
sponse of ﬁscal and monetary authorities in the wake of the crisis. It is also
interesting to note that the CPI does not rise to the medium-term level of
the won. In the context of the model, this seems to be represented by a per-
manent real depreciation sustained by ex post ﬁscal policies. The data, how-
ever, may reﬂect an exchange rate policy other than a pure ﬂoat.
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2. Velasco (1987) ﬁrst modeled this process in an essay in memory of Diaz-Alejandro. Chinn
and Kletzer (2000) and Dekle and Kletzer (forthcoming) provide somewhat diﬀerent models
with microeconomic detail of an increasingly fragile domestic banking system under a ﬁxed
exchange rate.On the basis of ﬁgures 7.3 and 7.4 and the modelling of departures from
purchasing power parity, I think that it would be useful to add nominal
rigidities to the calibrated model. Sluggish nominal price adjustment could
be used to match the rate of convergence of the price level to the exchange
rate for Mexico and might allow the authors to simulate the exchange rate
path for Korea. Indeed, it is sluggish nominal price adjustment that allows
overshooting of the exchange rate in the standard monetary model of the
exchange rate. A natural model of nominal price adjustment to adopt here
would be the staggered price setting model of Calvo (1983).
The main contribution of this paper is its approach for calculating the ﬁs-
cal adjustment to a ﬁnancial crisis and how this adjustment can be recon-
ciled with the ex post rates of nominal depreciation and domestic inﬂation.
The authors have taken care in estimating unanticipated inﬂation tax rev-
enues from the devaluation of various public-sector obligations. These in-
clude nominally indexed public debt of diﬀerent maturities and public-
sector wages, transfer payments, and similar obligations. The method used
for distinguishing the impact of ﬁscal reforms, both explicit and implicit (re-
duction in the real value of public sector wages, and so forth), on the pri-
mary budget surplus is notably sensible. The authors do raise some appro-
priate ways to improve their estimates of the ﬁscal adjustment to crises, but
the paper is already thorough and careful.
Some of the most interesting conclusions of this paper are the authors’
estimates of how much ﬁscal adjustment remains for both Mexico and Ko-
rea. I think the comparison of historical rates of seigniorage revenue gener-
ation by each government to the remaining costs of the crisis is particularly
useful. The conclusions that Mexico may have already or can be expected
to meet the costs of the crisis through the printing press is consistent with
the model, postcrisis rates of inﬂation and depreciation, and historical ex-
perience. Similarly, the conclusion that Korea has not yet paid the full ﬁs-
cal costs of the crisis and is unlikely to do so by generating higher rates of
seigniorage revenues is both an interesting and a useful conclusion of the
calibration exercise. The calculation of ﬁscal adjustment in this paper is
taken seriously, and the paper makes a very useful contribution to the liter-
ature on currency crisis management. I realize that calculating the ﬁscal re-
sponse for each country is time-consuming, but I encourage the authors to
extend their calculations of ﬁscal adjustment (and of how much adjustment
remains) to Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
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Discussion Summary
Allan Drazen remarked that the model could be seen as too rich; in particu-
lar, it encompasses several types of uncertainty regarding the choice of fu-
ture policy, suggesting that certain dynamics of the model can be explained
by several diﬀerent paths of expectations. He also recommended that the
paper elaborate on the political considerations regarding the choice of cri-
sis management policies.
Andrew K. Rose asked whether the model could be applied to diﬀerent
types of crises, such as the California energy crisis. In response, Martin
Eichenbaum noted that the currency of California is pegged to the U.S. dol-
lar and that the model explicitly rules out the possibility of default.
Nouriel Roubini noted that the pass-through of inﬂation has been very
small. He added that exchange rates tend to overshoot and, as a plausible
explanation, suggested that the possibility of ﬁnancing of ﬁscal costs
through seigniorage revenues would initially incur a large depreciation. He
argued that once the ﬁnancial markets realized that no additional money
was printed, the exchange rate would revert.
222 A. Craig Burnside, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio RebeloJong-Wha Lee asked whether it was possible to match permanent shifts
in real exchange rates within the framework of the model.
Joshua Aizenmanmade a reference to the substantial current account ad-
justment of the Korean economy and wondered whether the model was able
to replicate such magnitudes. He suggested that the model was missing the
element of capital ﬂight.
Olivier Jeanne remarked that the dynamics of the exchange rate in this
model were quite reminiscent of the Dornbusch overshooting model. He
also noted a discrepancy between the model and the facts: market partici-
pants did not seem to worry very much about the ﬁscal consequences of
banking bailouts at the time of the Asian crisis. For example, in the months
that followed the outburst of the crisis, the Financial Times Currency Fore-
caster referred to ﬁscal deﬁcits only one time in its analysis of currency de-
velopments in Asia, and this was to worry that excessively tight ﬁscal poli-
cies would delay the recovery. This seems diﬃcult to reconcile with the
model. However, Martin Wolf recently presented in the Financial Times an
analysis of the Turkish crisis that is very close to Burnside, Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo’s model. Maybe, he jokingly wondered, this is a case of reality
coming closer to theory.
Andrew Berg commented on the calibration of the model and expressed
concern with the choice of base period for the case of Mexico.
John McHale noted that it is very diﬃcult for a crisis-hit economy to is-
sue long-term nonindexed debt and politically hard to maintain nonin-
dexed expenditures.
Sergio Rebelonoted that the main focus of the paper is the analysis of the
role for seigniorage in the context of large depreciations absent of substan-
tial inﬂation. He pointed out that the paper is concerned with crisis man-
agement rather than with the possible causes of the crisis. He agreed that a
useful extension of the paper would be to build a stochastic model. With re-
spect to the issue of overshooting, he pointed out that the paper discusses
cases of economies other than Korea and Mexico. On the issue of the data
set, he noted that prices are hard to measure because a large fraction of
prices in emerging market economies are controlled by governments. As an
example, he noted that this is the case for 20 percent of Mexican prices. As
a further example, he pointed to the case of Korea, where the price of a good
no longer in stock is set to the price of the good when it was in stock, thereby
tending to understate inﬂation. In response to Roubini, he noted that prices
and exchange rates display a large degree of comovement.
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